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Knowing When To Walk Away: An Analysis of Gambling
Debts Under Louisiana Law in Light of Telerecovery of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Major and Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Gaulon
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the issue of whether gambling debts are enforceable in Louisiana
resurfaced in two appellate courts. In Telerecovery ofLouisiana, Inc. v. Major' and
Telerecovery ofLouisiana, Inc. v. Gaulon,2 the first and fifth circuit courts of appeal
enforced markers' issued to casinos by their patrons for gambling purposes.4 The
Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied writs of certiorari.' With the
legalization of gaming in Louisiana, the courts struggled with competing Louisiana
Civil Code articles that recognize the validity of obligations with lawful causes but
at the same time disallow actions to enforce that which has been won or lost at
gaming. Because the courts ignored the relationship between the underlying
policies behind the seemingly inconsistent articles, they reversed a long trend of
jurisprudence where courts have refused a creditor from recovering money lent for
gaming activities. Major and Gaulon reflect a definite change in the law and create
new precedent to allow civil actions for the enforcement of gambling debts.6
This article begins with a presentation of Major and Gaulon in Part II. Part III
analyzes each court's reasoning and gives an overview of the jurisprudence dealing
with gambling debts in Louisiana. Part III, Section A discusses the analysis
Louisiana courts have traditionally used to deny actions to enforce gambling debts.
Sections B, C and D of Part III demonstrate how the Major and Gaulon courts
followed the traditional approach to enforce the gambling markers by relying only
on the legality ofgaming instead of considering public policy when determining the
effects the gaming legislation had on the cause of the obligation. Part IV, Section
A explains how courts might justify adherence to the traditional jurisprudential
approach of refusing to enforce gambling debts. Finally, Part IV, Section B
1. 734 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 750 So. 2d 196 (1999) [hereinafter Major].
2. 738 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 751 So. 2d 224 (1999) [hereinafter Gaulon].
3. In a casino, a marker is a credit slip signedby a patron, stating the amount of money advanced
to the patron. Thomas L. Clark, The Dictionary of Gambling & Gaming 126 (1984). A marker can also
authorize a casino to withdraw specified funds from the patron's bank account at a specified drawee
bank.
4. In Gaulon, the judgment against the defendant was based on two different grounds:
enforcement of gambling debts and enforcement of negotiable instruments. Only the issue of the
enforceability of gaming debts as discussed in both cases will be analyzed in this note.
5. Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v. Major, 750 So. 2d 196 (La. 1999); Telerecovery of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Gaulon, 751 So.2d 224 (La. 1999). In both cases, Justice Victory stated he would
have granted writs.
6. See In re Sigust,255 B.R. 822(Bankr. W.D. La. 2000)(applyingMajorand Gaulonto enforce
checks and I.O.U.'s given by a gambler for cash in order to play video poker); Players Lake Charles,
L.L.C. v. Tribble, 779 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 3d 2001).
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concludes with some proposals, including how the courts, the legislature and the
casinos should approach this issue under current Louisiana law.
I. THE CASES
A. Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v. Major
In Telerecovery ofLouisiana, Inc. v. Major,7 the defendant, a gambler, issued
three $10,000 markers to the Belle of Baton Rouge' ("the Belle") riverboat casino
and three markers totaling $35,0009 to the Grand Casino of Avoyelles ("the
Grand").'" In exchange for the markers, the Belle and the Grand gave Major chips
that he used to gamble and later lost on the same day." The drawee bank of the
markers refused payment and returned them to the casinos marked NSF. 2 Both
casinos assigned collection to Telerecovery.'"
When Telerecovery sought to recover the amounts due on the six markers,
Major moved for summary judgment claiming that Louisiana Civil Code articles
2983 and 298414 prevented Telerecovery from collecting on the markers. Without
written reasons, the trial judge granted Major's motion and dismissed
Telerecovery's claim. The first circuit court of appeal reversed and remanded to
allow collection on the markers.'-
The first circuit dissected Major's gambling excursion at the casinos into two
transactions: (1) when Major issued a marker to purchase chips from the casino (the
"marker for chips transaction") and (2) when Major gambled his chips at the casino.
The court explained that because parties "do not intend to violate the law" in
business transactions, 6 the "marker-for-chips transaction" would not be illegal if
7. 734 So. 2d 947 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1999).
8. The Belle of Baton Rouge casino is a riverboat casino located in Baton Rouge, East Baton
Rouge Parish, Louisiana. It is licensed to conduct gaming activities pursuant toLa. R.S. 27:201-286
(Supp. 2001).
9. The amounts of the checks were $5,000, $15,000 and $15,000. Major, 734 So. 2d at 948.
10. The Grand Casino of Avoyelles is an Indian gaming establishment located in Marksville,
Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. It is authorized to conduct gaming activities under federal law.
11. Major, 734 So. 2d at 949.
12. NSF is an acronym for Non-Sufficient Funds, not having enough money in an account to pay
a check when presented.
13. Major, 734 So. 2d at 948.
14. La. Civ. Code art. 2983 states:
The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at gaming orby a bet, except
for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such as the exercise of the gun and
foot, horse and chariot racing. And as to such games, the judge may reject the demand, when
the sum appears to him excessive.
La. Civ. Code art. 2984 provides: "In all cases in which the law refuses an action to the winner, it also
refuses to suffer the loser to reclaim what he has voluntarily paid, unless there has been, on the part of
the winner, fraud, deceit, or swindling."
15. Major, 734 So. 2d at 951.
16. Id. at 950 citing A Better Place, Inc. v. Giani Inv. Co., 445 So. 2d 728, 732 (La. 1984).
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there was a reasonable explanation to support its validity. 7 The court approved the
transaction because Major "could have walked out of the casinos with [the chips] or he
could have converted them to cash and then walked out," 8 and thus it was not "void for
want ofconsideration." 9 Because the court found valid consideration in the "marker for
chips transaction," it held that Major had incurred an enforceable debt.9
The court noted that a second obligation arose when Major gambled with the chips
he received. Because it found that Civil Code articles 2983 and 2984 did not prevent the
enforcement of the "marker for chips transaction," the court declined to consider the
validity of the second obligation.2'
In a concurring opinion, Judge Weimer agreed that the whole transaction should be
dissected and that the marker was enforceable because no unlawful gaming activity
occurred in the "marker for chips transaction.'" He acknowledged similar Louisiana 3
and federal jurisprudence that had refused to enforce extensions of credit for gambling
purposes but did not base his decision on that issue because no such allegation had been
asserted. 5 Judge Weimer admitted that Louisiana Civil Code articles 2983 and 2984
illustrate "a clear intent to prevent an action for gaming debts,"2 and that to protect
problem gamblers, it is not inconsistent with public policy to permit gaming and also
prevent the enforcement of gaming winnings or losses.Y He also refused to assume that
the enactment of the legislation to legalize gaming modified or implicitly repealed
Articles 2983 and 2984. Nonetheless, he adhered to the court's dissection of the entire
transaction and agreed with its holding that the "markers for chips trinsaction" was valid
and enforceable because it did not directly involve gaming games."
B. Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v. Gaulon
In Telerecovey of Louisiana, Inc. v. Gaulon," Gaulon issued two markers totaling
$10,000 to the Belle in return for chips that he used to gamble at the Belle. The drawee
17. Id. citing Tipton v. Loker, 230 So. 2d 125, 127 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 951.
22. Id.
23. See Russo v. Mula, 49 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (dismissing plaintiff's argument
that defendant's check, which replaced a prior check used to pay defendant's gaming debts, was a
separate and distinct transaction because the gambling activity was conducted and promoted by the
plaintiff and the money advanced to defendant was for the purpose of covering losses suffered in the
game); Dominov. Labord,99So. 2d841 (La. App. IstCir. 1957)(precludingplaintifffrommaintaining
an action on an obligation contracted in her establishment for the purpose of gambling with her full
knowledge and consent).
24. See Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 53 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995); Carnival Leisure
Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1991).
25. Major, 734 So. 2d at 951 n.2.
26. Id. at 952.
27. Id. at 952.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 738 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
NOTE2001]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
bank of the markers refused payment because of insufficient funds in Gaulon's account
and returned them to the Belle. The Belle assigned collection of the markers to
Telerecovery.
Instead of seeking enforcement of the obligation to pay as it had in Major,
Telerecovery sought recovery pursuant to the Nonsufficient Funds Checks statute.3
The trial judge found that the markers were checks under the negotiable instruments
law and awarded Telerecovery the penalties set forth in the NSF statutes.32 On
appeal, Gaulon asserted that the gambling markers were unenforceable debts
because of Article 2983."3 The fifth circuit court of appeal rejected that argument
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.'
The fifth circuit reasoned that Louisiana Civil Code article 2983 did not apply
to legalized forms of gaming.3" Because Louisiana statutes authorize riverboat
gaming activities's and exempt them from the crime of gambling,37 the court
enforced the markers and held that Civil Code art. 2983 was not applicable.3 In
Major and Gaulon, the supreme court subsequently denied writs of certiorari. 9
IlL. ANALYSIS
The flawed reasoning of the courts in Major and Gaulon led them to
wrongfully enforce markers issued by gamblers to casinos for use in gaming
activities at the casinos. The courts should have analyzed the following issues more
closely and perhaps then they might have concluded differently: (1) the use of cause
instead of consideration in the formation of obligations under Louisiana law, (2) the
effect of the gaming legislation on Louisiana obligations law, and (3) the public
policy behind the coexistent statutory gaming laws and the Louisiana Civil Code's
prohibition of enforcing wins or recovering losses derived from gaming. Had the
courts examined these issues, they would have realized that the cause of a gambling
debt should be analyzed separately from Articles 2983 and 2984 and thereby
concluded that Articles 2983 and 2984 continue to deny civil actions to enforce
gambling debts, even ones that may now have a lawful cause.
31. La. R.S. 9:2782 (1991).
32. Gaulon, 738 So. 2d at 662.
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id. The court also found the markers were negotiable instruments subject to the NSF check
statute and that default judgment on Gaulon was proper. Id. at 664-68. However, the reasoning behind
this holding will not be discussed due to the narrow focus of this paper on the enforceability of gaming
winnings and losses.
35. Id. at 664 citing Lauer v. Catalanotto, 522 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
36. La. R.S. 27:41-113 (Supp. 2001). The court found that legislative authority was granted
pursuant to La. Const. art. XII, § 6(B). Gaulon, 738 So. 2d at 664 citing Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d
1128 (La. 1993).
37. La. R.S. 14:90(D) (Supp. 2000).
38. Gaulon, 738 So. 2d at 664.
39. See Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v. Major, 750 So. 2d 196 (La. 1999); Telerecovery of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Gaulon, 751 So. 2d 224 (La. 1999).
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A. An Historical Perspective
Since its formation and adoption, the Louisiana Civil Code has expressly
forbidden civil actions for the recovery of contracts pertaining to gambling
winnings and losses.' Louisiana Civil Code articles 2983 and 2984 deny any
action for payment of what has been won at gaming or for recovery of what has
been lost.4' Traditionally, courts have used these articles to prevent enforcement
of gambling contracts that had an unlawful cause 42 a result that is prohibited by
law or is against public policy.43 Because gambling establishments were prohibited
and deemed contrary to public policy until the 1974 constitutional changes" and the
subsequent legislative authorizations of gambling,' 5 Louisiana courts almost
consistently applied Articles 2983 and 2984 to disallow recovery of gambling debts
due to their unlawful cause.
Courts refused recovery of money lent to gamblers by owners or operators of
locales where gambling took place. Because the loans were used to pay back what
the gamblers had lost to "the house," courts found the cause of the obligation was
unlawful or contrary to public policy and good morals.' For example, in Bagneris
v. Smoot the plaintiff owned a gambling house in which the defendant played
roulette on credit.47 The defendant ultimately paid his debt with a loan from the
plaintiff. The court held that because roulette was a "game" encompassed by
Article 2983, the plaintiff's loan had an unlawful cause and thus was
unenforceable. 4' Temporary operators of gaming establishments have also been
denied recovery of money lent to gamblers for gambling purposes. 4'9 Furthermore,
40. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2 and 3 (1808); see also Code Napoleon arts. 1965,1966(1804) and
Projet du Governement Book III, Title XIX, art. 2 (1800). These sources were used by the drafters of
the Louisiana Civil Code and contain almost identical language to current Louisiana Civil Code articles
2983 and 2984.
41. See supra note 14.
42. Cause is the reason a party enters into a contract. La. Civ. Code art. 1967. See generallySafil
Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 La. L. Rev. 3 (1987) for a summary explanation of cause.
43. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966,1968.
44. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text.
46. Bagnerisv. Smoot, 159 La. 1049,106 So. 561 (La. 1925);see also Nielsen v. Planter's Trust
& Savings Banks of Opelousas, 183 La. 645, 164 So. 613 (La. 1935) (remanding to allow plaintiff
recovery on a cashier's check issued by defendant to him and paid by defendant to a third party after
plaintiff negotiated the check in payment of gambling losses to third party and then notified defendant
of the unlawful cause of the negotiation); Friel v. Murchison, 8 La.App. 354 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1928)
(denying plaintiffrecovery from decedent's heirs for decedent's check cashed by plaintifffor gambling
in plaintiff's establishment); Domino v. Laborde, 99 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (precluding
plaintiff from maintaining an action on an obligation contracted in her establishment for the purpose of
gambling with her full knowledge and consent).
47. Bagneris, 106 So. at 562.
48. Id.
49. See West v. Loe Pipe Yard, 125 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (denying recovery based
on an unlawful cause because defendant issued checks to employee of gaming establishment to cover
gamblinglosses where plaintiffwas in complete control of establishment and had full knowledge of the
gambling activity).
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courts have refused to enforce loans to pay gambling losses when the lender was
an active participant in gambling games.e Whether the gambling occurred in
Louisiana or out of state, Louisiana courts refused remedy to the parties
involved.5 Finally, the courts have refused recovery where the contract sought to
be enforced was connected to or arose out of gambling activities."
While Louisiana courts have refused to enforce repayments of loans where the
gambler intended to gamble or repay a gambling debt with the proceeds, some
courts have enforced gambling loans where a lender and gambler did not have a
mutual intent to gamble. Those courts held that the intent of one party not
communicated to or concurred in by the other did not nullify an agreement to
repay a gambling debt.53 Additionally, courts have allowed the lender to recover
money loaned when he was wholly unconnected with the gambling activities, even
though he had knowledge it was to pay a gambling debt.' While these holdings
appear contradictory, there is a subtle factual distinction that justifies the
enforcement of these types of obligations. In the three examples discussed, the
money was not lent by gambling operators and was not seen as furthering the
borrower's gambling activities. Rather, it was lent to pay back money the
borrower had already lost by gambling." Thus, the cause of a loan whose
50. See Keen v. Butterworth, 185 So. 37 (La. App. Orl. 1938) (denyingrecovery on defendant's
promissory notes in settlement of defendant's gambling losses incurred notlirectly to plaintiff but in
a game where plaintiff was a participant).
51. See Lauer v. Catalanotto, 522 So. 2d 656, 658 (La. App.5th Cir. 1988) (allowing recovery
but rejecting one of plaintiffs arguments by stating, "[t]he fact that the gambling took place in a state
in which it is legal does not grant plaintiff a remedy to recover such monies under Louisiana law").
52. In Meyer v. Stock, 6 OrI. App. 175 (La. App. 1909), the court denied recovery on promissory
notes given to satisfy gamblingdebts. Plaintiff argued that the notes were given as security for the debt
and not in payment of the debt. QuotingMadere v. Succession ofOry, 5Orl. App. 188 (La. App. 1908),
the court held that in addition to principal contracts with illegal purposes, it would not entertain suits to
enforce any collateral ones connected with or growing out the principal contract. See also Russo v.
Mula, 49 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1950) (dismissing plaintiff's argument that defendant's check,
which replaced a prior check used to pay defendant's gaming debts, was a separate and distinct
transaction because the gambling activity was conducted and promoted by the plaintiff and the money
advanced to defendant was for the purpose of covering losses suffered in the game). See also Lamy v.
Will, 140 So. 2d 794,795 (La. App. 4d Cir. 1962) (finding debt unenforceable due to an unlawful cause
even though the money was loaned prior to defendant's placing it in the game in which plaintiff was a
participant because "[t]he transaction was and remained a part of the gambling activity and plaintiff is
precluded from maintaining an action thereon").
53. Lauer v. Catalanotto, 522 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) citing Jordan v. Bache& Co.,
Inc., 360 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 4d Cit. 1978) and enforcing a loan made to defendant used to pay
gambling debts because plaintiffwas not involved in the gambling transaction in which money was lost.
54. Brand v. Evans, 7 La. App. 205 (1st Cir. 1927) (allowing enforcementof a check issued by
defendant to plaintiff for the payment of a gambling debt even though plaintiff knew its destination
because plaintiff took no part in the game and it was not on plaintiff'spremises even though plaintiff
was present); Clemons v. Succession of Johnson, 10 La. App. 230,120 So. 664 (OrI. 1929) (enforcing
plaintiff's loan to deceased for payment of gambling debts even though plaintiff had knowledge of use
of proceeds because plaintiff was not involved in game or locale where money was lost).
55. See Clemons, 120 So. at 665 ("the plaintiff, loaned him the money with which to pay the
[gambling] debt"); Brand, 7 La. App. at 206 ("that plaintiffat the request of the defendant, who wished
to pay his losses to Pressly, loaned him this amount of money"); Lauer, 522 So. 2dat 658 (affirming
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proceeds are used to gamble is distinguishable from the cause of a loan used to pay
back a gambling loss.
The French, whose Code Civil article 1965 prohibits judicial action for a
gambling debt,56 have distinguished loans that encourage gambling from a loan
used to pay prior gambling debts. The highest court of ordinary jurisdiction in
France, the Cour de cassation, has held that where gaming activity is authorized
and regulated by the law, a casino patron can resort to French Code Civil article
1965 to void a debt only if he can prove that the loan was given by the casino to
further gaming activities." French commentators have explained the courts' refusal
to enforce credit given for gambling through positive law and have argued that
Article 1965 was designed to prevent a gambler from worsening his future financial
situation by limiting his access to immediate disposable funds." Thus, the French
approach may explain why Louisiana courts have refused to enforce loans that
furthered gambling but have enforced loans used to pay a prior gambling debt.
In contrast, the cause of an obligation to repay money lent to pay a gambling
debt may be valid. Professor Sail Litvinoff - has argued that all actions derived
from gambling should be unenforceable because the inherent abuses of gambling
always create an unlawful cause of an obligation. If derivative actions were
enforced, the purpose behind the enforcement prohibitions of Articles 2983 and
2984 would be circumvented and rendered impracticable.'e
However, other scholars have argued that a natural obligation may be the cause
of a loan used to repay a gambling debt. In some legal systems, a gambler's natural
obligation to protect his honor by paying his gambling debt has been deemed to be
a sufficient cause of gambler's obligation to repay money lent to pay a gambling
debt.6 The French label this enforceable obligation a "dette de jeu, dette
d 'honneur" or "gambling debt, debt of honor," and recognize that protecting one's
honor may be a lawful cause for a loan to pay prior gambling debts.62 Thus, if a
award on reconventional demand by finding the "[p]laintiffadmitted borrowing the money, but claimed
he had been playing dice and had signed a marker to the hotel for the amount").
56. Code Civil art. 1965 (99th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 2000) (Fr.) ("La loi n'accorde aucune
action pour une dette de jeu ou pour le payment d'un pan").
57. Cass. Ie civ., Jan. 31,1984, D. 1985,note DIENER; Cass. le civ., Jul. 20, 1988, Bull Civ. 1,
No. 257.
58. Alain Bdnabent, Droit Civil: Les Contrats Sp~ciaux 546-47 (1995) [hereinaflerB6nabent];
and Alain Bdnabent, J.C.P. 71, II, 16728.
59. Professor Sail Litvinoffis a Boyd Professor, Oliver P. Stockwell Professor of Law and the
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
He is also the official reporter for obligations law to the Louisiana Law Institute, the author of a treatise
in obligations and considered an authority in Louisiana obligations law.
60. See I Saul Litvinoff, Obligations § 340, at 593 in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969); 1
Saill Litvinoff, Obligations § 2.23, at 43 in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992).
61. See I Saill Litvinoff, Obligations § 340, at 593 n.I 3in 6 LouisianaCivil Law Treatise (1 969)
citing 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Franqais Suivant L'Ordre du CodeNo. 381(B) at 469. According to
Toullier, knights and military officerscould be brought before a special tribunal of Field Marshals of
France to uphold their honor and pay their gambling debts. See also I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the
Law 150 (1996).
62. See B6nabent, supra note 58, at 545. See also Phillippe Malaurie and Laurent Ayn6s, Cours
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person unconnected with the underlying gambling activity loans a gambler money so
he can repay his losses, a valid cause of honor is found and the obligation is
enforceable.
If the gambling establishment, however, is the lender ofmoney used to pay back
a gambling debt like a marker, then Professor Litvinoff s argument should trump the
"honor as a valid cause" theory because the loan is derivative of the gambling activity.
In Players Lake Charles, L.L. C. v. Tribble, the court was presented with this factual
situation.63 There, Tribble issued markers to Players that were retumed NSF.' In order
to avoid criminal prosecution, Tribble signed a promissory note with Players and
promised to repay approximately $70,000.6' The court relied onMajor and found that
the loan was an enforceable obligation. Had the court employed the reasoning
advocated by Professor Litvinoff, it would have found the loan between Tribble and
Players to be as unenforceable as the initial marker. There also would have been no
room to argue honor because the lender was intertwined not only with the marker but
also with the loan made to cover it so as to taint the entire transaction.
The Louisiana jurisprudence, therefore, reveals that courts have traditionally
applied Articles 2983 and 2984 to prohibit actions to enforce gambling debts only
when there is an unlawful cause of the obligation. However, the courts have carved out
two exceptions and have not applied Articles 2983 and 2984 when there was no mutual
intent to gamble and no participation in gambling activities by the lender. These
exceptions really are analogous to the distinction drawn by the French-the nullity of
a loan that furthers gambling versus the enforceability of a loan used to satisfy a prior
gambling debt. Thus, it appears from the jurisprudence that loans that furthered
gambling have an unlawful cause and trigger the application ofArticles 2983 and 2984,
whereas those that repay a prior gambling debt have a lawful cause and do not trigger
Articles 2983 and 2984.
B. Cause v. Consideration
In Major, the first circuit distinguished Major's payment for chips with an
instrument of debt to create a distinct obligation from the act of gambling with the
chips. It found that the "marker for chips transaction" was not "void for want of
consideration" and thus was an enforceable obligation. While the court recognized
the existence of cause, 7 it failed to interpret cause as it applied to the transaction in
Major. Instead, it relied on the common law concept of consideration.
A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are
created.68 The cause of an obligation is the reason why a party incurs an
de Droit Civil: Les Contrats Spciaux 502-05 (1990).
63. Players Lake Charles, L.L.C. v. Tribble, 779 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 1059.
65. Id.
66. Telerecovery v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947, 950 (La. App. I st Cir. 1999).
67. See id. where the court acknowledgedthe code articles that defined cause and unlawful cause.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 1906.
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obligation.' Had the court in Major considered the cause of the obligation, it would
have asked two questions: (1) why or for what reason did Major issue the marker for
the chips? and (2) why or for what reason did the casinos extend credit and give Major
chips? The answer to both questions would have been "to use in gaming activities."
Thus, the true cause for the extension of credit was for Major to partake in gaming
activities at the casinos.
Instead, the Major court incorrectly applied "common law" analysis and found
valid consideration, or a quid pro quo, in the "marker for chips transaction."
Additionally, it ignored the necessity of a lawful cause when it discussed the
subsequent uses of the chips Major acquired after he issued a marker to the casino. The
court noted, for example, that because Major's use of the chips was not restricted to
gambling, there was no taint ofgaming activity in the "marker for chips transaction."7"
Presented with the same argument, the court in Keen v. Butterworth recognized that
loan proceeds could be used to purchase cards, refreshments, tobacco, and food.7
However, that court held that the notes were unenforceable because they "were
connected with the main unlawful enterprise to such an extent that they were
inseparable from it."' In Cahn v. Baccich & DeMontluzin, Justice Monroe arguably
correctly dissented in an action to enforce a contract subsequent to a related illegal
transaction by finding that an action had to be completely disconnected from any prior
illegal activities to be enforceable." Under such analysis, even if Major could have
purchased food and drink or cashed in his chips, those transactions would have been
void for cause because of their close connection to the extension of credit. Again, had
the court in Major inquired into the cause of the obligation, it would have concluded
that Major used the chips only to gamble.74 Furthermore, because consideration has no
room in Louisiana law,75 the court should have inquired into the cause of the obligation
involved.
C. Did the enactment of gaming legislation eliminate unlawful cause?76
The Major court acknowledged that an obligation's cause is unlawful when the
enforcement of the obligation would produce a result prohibited by law or against
69. La. Civ. Code art. 1967. See alsoToullier and Duvergier, Le Droit Civil Fran~ais, Suivant
L'Ordre Du Code vol. 3, § 4-166, at 103-04 (6th ed.); Saii Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48
La. L. Rev. 3 (1987).
70. Major, 734 So. 2d at 950-51.
71. Keen v. Butterworth, 185 So. 37 (La. App. Orl. 1938).
72. Id. at 40. See also Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1990). There, the court, in
dicta, found that chips had little economic substance inside the casino for purchases of food, drink and
refreshments since those items are usually complimentary. Additionally, the court said realistically the
casino would not allow a gambler to leave the building after exchanging his chips for cash without
paying a debt incurred to receive those chips.
73. Cahn v. Baccich & De Montluzin, 144 La. 1023,81 So. 696(1918). The majority enforced
the transfer of property between two bidders in an auction who tossed a coin to end the bidding and
determine the recipient of the property.
74. Telerecovery v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947, 949 (La. App. I st Cir. 1999).
75. La. Civ. Code art. 1967 cmt. c ("Under the Article, 'cause' is not 'consideration').
76. This section only addresses the provisions of enacted legislation concerninggambling debts.
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public policy." Had the court inquired into the cause of the extension of credit for
gambling rather than focusing on consideration, the contract of loan would have
been rendered unenforceable due to a lack of cause for reasons stated above."
While the Major court declined to comment on this issue, the Gaulon court
insufficiently addressed it. It concluded that the gambling debt was an enforceable
contract with a lawful cause because the gaming activities at issue were authorized
by statute and exempted from the criminal definition of gambling. 9 Because the
Gaulon court ignored the possibility that public policy can also render a cause
unlawful, it incorrectly held that the extension of credit to participate in gaming
activities had a lawful cause.
For nearly one hundred years, the Louisiana Constitution labeled gambling as
a vice and directed the legislature to suppress it."° However the 1974 Constitution
incorporated two important changes: the removal of the label of gambling as a vice
and the addition of a mandate to the legislature to define gambling."' In Polk v.
Edwards, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted these changes as eliminating
gambling's moral condemnation and as a call on the legislature to determine "how,
when, where and in what respects gambling shall be prohibited or permitted."82
In order to continue the growth of the tourism industry for the benefit of the
general welfare and to create new jobs, 3 the Louisiana Legislature responded to the
constitutional call and enacted the Louisiana Riverboat Economic Development and
Gaming Control Act ("The Riverboat Act")" in 1991 and the Louisiana Economic
Development and Gaming Control Act ("The Casino Act") 5 in 1992. These acts
make it legal for gaming licensees to possess, offer, or play any authorized game86
or gaming device 7 in their places of business as defined by each act. 8 By enacting
77. Major, 734 So. 2d at 950.
78. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966,2029.
79. Telerecovery v. Gaulon, 738 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
80. La. Const. art. 19, §8 (1921); La. Const. arts. 188, 189 (1913); La. Const. arts. 188, 189
(1898); La. Const. art. 172 (1879).
81. "Gamblingshall be definedby and suppressedby the legislature." La. Const. art. XII, § 6 (B).
82. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128,1141 (La. 1993). See also Gandolfo v. Louisiana State
Racing Comm'n, 227 La. 45,78 So. 2d 504 (1954).
83. La. R.S. 27:42 (A)(1), 27:202 (BXI) (Supp. 2000).
84. 1991 La. Acts No. 753, La. R.S. 4:501-562 (Supp. 1993) (redesignated La. R.S. 27:41-113
by 1996 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess, No. 7, § 3.). This redesignation replaced the Riverboat Gaming
Commission with the Louisiana Gaming Control Board and transferred to it the sole and exclusive
regulatory and supervisory powers for gaming operations and activities authorized by the Riverboat
Gaming Act.
85. 1992 La. Acts No. 384, La. R.S. 4:601-686(Supp. 1993)(redesignated La. R.S. 27:201-286
by 1996 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 7, § 3). This redesignation replaced the Louisiana Economic
Development and Gaming Corporation with the Louisiana Gaming Control Board and transferred to it
the sole and exclusive regulatory and supervisory powers for gaming operations and activities authorized
by the Casino Act.
86. A game is defined as "any banking or percentage game" located within an official gaming
establishment 'which is played with cards, dice, or any electronic, electrical, or mechanical device or
machine for money, property, or anything of value." La. R.S. 27:44(10), 27:205(12) (Supp. 2000).
87. A gamingdevice is "any equipment... used directly or indirectly in connection with gaming
or any game, which affects the result of a wager by determining wins or losses." La. K.S. 27:44(12),
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the Riverboat and Casino Acts, the legislature created a new and distinguishable
class of gambling activities termed "gaming."
Because gambling as a business is criminalized under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:90,s9 the Legislature exempted gaming licensees from criminal liability
by removing those establishments authorized by the Riverboat Gaming Act and the
Casino Act from the statutes' definition of gambling.' ° This change effectively
created an exception from the usual crime of gambling as a business to distinguish
gaming conducted by a licensee as a legal activity. The court in Polk reiterated this
distinction and stated that gambling is legal as long as the legislature does not
restrict it by enacting criminal penalties.9 In effect, gaming and gambling are the
same acts (wagering money on games of chance) except the latter carries criminal
consequences when carried on as an unlicenced business. '
The gaming acts only affected establishments that operated as gaming houses
not individual gamblers themselves. According to the official comments to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:90, it has never been illegal for people to gamble in
Louisiana.9" Yet, while it had been legal for individuals to gamble between
themselves, the courts had refused to enforce wins or losses incurred from gambling
activities for lack of a lawful cause. What is the unlawful cause that renders
obligations based on gambling losses unenforceable? It can no longer be gambling
as a business because the Legislature has given its authorization. As discussed
infra, courts also found the extension of credit to gamble as an unlawful cause.
However, the Legislature closed that route when it delegated the authority to the
Gaming Board to create rules governing the issuance of credit to casino patrons.9
In turn, the Gaming Board promulgated rules, which allowed casino licensees to
issue credit to gamblers."
Given that the Legislature and the Gaming Board have authorized most of the
activities that had rendered causes unlawful, now the only way to deny enforcement
27:205(13) (Supp. 2000).
88. La. R.S. 27:269 (Supp. 2000).
89. La. R.S. 14:90 (1987 and Supp. 2000).
90. La. R.S. 14:90 (Supp. 2000) states that gambling is a crime only if run as a business, except
for those businesses licensed by the state.
91. Polkv. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128,1140 (La. 1993).
92. Using this reasoning, gambling debts are the same as gaming debts and may be used
interchangeably.
93. "No attempt has been made to punish the patrons of gambling establishments because of the
apparent impossibility ofenforcement. Only those operating gambling devices as a business and those
assisting directly are covered." La. R.S. 14:90 reporter's comments (1987). See also Gandolfo v.
Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504 (1954) (holding that La. R.S. 14:90
prohibits gambling as a business and does not prohibit gambling between individuals).
94. La. R.S. 27:220 (Supp. 2001) ("The board shall adopt rules... specifying... (t]he granting
of credit to a patron); La. R.S. 27:52 (Supp. 2001) ("The commission shall ... promulgate rules
providing for and determining the following... [t]he procedures for negotiable instrument transactions
involving patrons, including limits ... and amounts of the transaction ... ").
95. La. Admin. Code 42:2729(l)(2000)("A [riverboat] licensee shall be permitted to issue credit
in its gaming operation"); La. Admin. Code tit. 42:2717(H)(2000) ("There shall be no other extension
of credit (in a land based casino] without a marker").
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of a gambling debt under the traditional approach is to find that the cause is
contrary to public policy. This argument has merit because there may still be a
significant public policy of disfavoring gambling on credit. This policy would
render an unlawful cause and allow courts to continue to deny enforcement of
actions under the traditional approach.
D. Public Policy
Because the Major and Gaulon courts relied on cause to apply Articles 2983
and 2984, they focused on the legalization of certain gambling activities under the
guise of "gaming." However, both courts ignored that public policy can also
create an unlawful cause and render an obligation null. Had they examined public
policy, they would have discovered the heart of the controversy-the difference
between the competing policies that accept gambling but deny actions to enforce
credit extended for gambling purposes. As a California appellate court duly noted
in Kelly v. First Astri Corp.,' public acceptance of gambling itself is
distinguishable from a deep-rooted policy against enforcement of gambling debts,
or gambling on credit. Had the courts in Major and Gaulon looked to the policies
behind the Riverboat and Casino Acts and Articles 2983 and 2984, they would
have found them to be distinct but compatible and concurrently serving the public
and private interests.
The Riverboat and Casino Acts clearly state that their policy is to promote
tourism and help the local economy.97 This broad policy encourages revenue from
tourism and expounds the public's acceptance of the act of gambling itself. While
not expressly stated, the policy behind the Civil Code's refusal to allow civil
actions to enforce gaming losses seems to be to protect the gambler from
temptations and effects created by the lure of gambling activities, such as not
spending beyond one's means, warding against a gambling addiction, and
protecting the general welfare of society. This narrower and more restrictive
policy limits casino patrons gambling funds to their disposable income and
protects them from mortgaging their financial solvency. The policy behind the
Civil Code, therefore, places practical limitations on the broader policy that
promotes gambling for tourism purposes.
The French appear to have drawn the same distinction. While the French will
not allow enforcement of a debt that encourages gambling,9" they have recognized
the validity of "cheques de casino" or markers.' However, they will not enforce
those markers where the patron did not have sufficient funds in his account to pay
for the debt.1" Under this reasoning, a French tribunal has also refused to enforce
a casino patron's check that was pre-imprinted by a casino and given in exchange
96. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999).
97. La. R.S. 27:42 (A)(1), 27:202 (BXI) (Supp. 2000).
98. See supra note 57.
99. Cass. Ie civ., Jan. 18, 1984, Bull Civ. I, No. 26.
100. Id.
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for chips.' Because the customer's account had insufficient funds to cover the
check, the tribunal described the check as an illegal extension of credit to
gamble.0" The tribunal held that because the check was like a loan that furthered
gambling, the obligation was unenforceable due to an immoral cause. °3 Thus,
while the French recognize the validity of markers, they appear to have a policy
against enforcing those that would jeopardize a gambler's future finances.
Like the courts in Major and Gaulon, other courts have failed to distinguish
these two policies. For example, in Intercontinental Hotels Corporation (Puerto
Rico) v. Golden, the Court of Appeals of New York held that a gambling debt was
enforceable in New York because public policy had shifted favorably towards
licensed gambling. 4 However, Chief Judge Desmond dissented and correctly
distinguished the two policies noting, "[t]he reason seems obvious. Curb the
professional with his constant offer of temptation coupled with ready opportunity,
and you have to a large extent controlled the evil."' ' Thus, it is wholly consistent
to have one policy that allows gambling and another that creates an implicit
"safety net" to control possible abuses. According to a study conducted by the
University of New Orleans, about two to three percent of Louisiana's population
is composed of pathological gamblers-a rate higher than the national average of
one to two percent.1° If the public is unable to control its gambling habits, the
Louisiana Legislature may have intended for Articles 2983 and 2984 to protect
those compulsive Louisiana gamblers from financial ruin.
At issue in Major and Gaulon was the lawfulness of the extension of credit by
casinos so its customers could gamble. By failing to inquire into cause of the
obligation and to distinguish the policies behind the gaming legislation and
Articles 2983 and 2984, the court in Gaulon misapplied Articles 2983 and 2984
when it enforced markers solely used to facilitate gambling. Under the traditional
approach, the public policy underlying Articles 2983 and 2984-protecting
gamblers from spending beyond their disposable means-would satisfy the
unlawful cause requirement, which in turn would trigger Articles 2983 and 2984.
However, reliance upon public policy to ultimately apply Articles 2983 and 2984
clearly shows the weakness of the traditional approach. Because public policy in
Louisiana has shifted more favorably towards gambling, future courts will be less
inclined to find an unlawful cause and apply Articles 2983 and 2984. When
public policy finally favors gambling on credit, Articles 2983 and 2984 will be
implicitly repealed under the traditional theory because of the inherent conflict.
Therefore, Louisiana courts must adopt a new approach to deny actions to enforce
gambling debts and continue to preserve the purpose and policy behind Articles
2983 and 2984.
101. T.G.I. Pontoise, Jun 29, 1988, D. 1990.42, note DIENER.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 213 (N.Y. 1964).
105. Id. at 215.
106. Anne Rochelle Konigsmark, Louisiana Betting Addicts Have Haven; State is one offew to
offer inpatient recovery for gamblers, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, March 26, 2000, at 6F.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. New Approach for Courts to Handle Gambling Debts
Louisiana courts have traditionally relied on a finding of unlawful cause to
apply Articles 2983 and 2984, an approach followed in Major and Gaulon. The
Major court concluded that an obligation had to have an unlawful cause to be
classified as agaming debt under Articles 2983 and 2984.°7 The Gaulon court held
that the obligation had to be illegal to be able to apply Articles 2983 and 2984. '0
Because the law does not prohibit the extension of credit to gamblers, only public
policy can create an unlawful cause and deny enforcement of an obligation
concerning gambling. Given that morality drives public policy and the latter is
subjective and ever changing, courts that continue to analyze gambling debts under
the traditional method will gradually chip away at the effectiveness of Articles 2983
and 2984.
However, requiring an unlawful cause to utilize Articles 2983 and 2984 limits
their purpose- to deny actions that seek to enforce winnings or losses from gaming
or bets. By focusing on cause as a requirement to apply Articles 2983 and 2984,
courts have made a familiar mistake in civil law obligations and have confused
cause with object. While cause is the subjective reason parties enter into an
obligation,"° the object of an obligation is the performance that the creditor expects
and the debtor must render."' Articles 2983 and 2984 refer to the payment of what
has been lost at gaming,"' the performance expected by the creditor of a gambling
debt. Thus, it appears that Articles 2983 and 2984 refer to the object of a gambling
debt (the payment of a gambler's losses) and not to its cause (to participate in the
act of gaming).
Because Articles 2983 and 2984 apply to those obligations whose object
pertains to payment of wins or losses from gaming, courts should discontinue using
unlawful cause as a prerequisite to Articles 2983 and 2984. Rather, courts first
should evaluate all of the contractual elements of the gambling debt, including the
lawfulness of its cause, to determine its validity. If the obligation has an unlawful
cause, it is unenforceable under the general obligations articles of the Louisiana
Civil Code" and the analysis ends there. However, if the obligation's cause is
lawful, courts should look further to the nature of the obligation's object and should
apply Articles 2983 and 2984 to those obligations whose objects are the payment
of gaming wins or losses. Accordingly, Louisiana courts should deny civil action
to enforce those obligations.
The reason courts should deviate from the traditional approach and adhere to
the two-step approach stems from the organization of the Civil Code and the
107. Telerecovery v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947, 950-51 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
108. Telerecovery v. Gaulon, 738 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
109. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
110. 1 Sa6I Litvinoff, Obligations § 1.3, at 4 in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992).
111. La. Civ. Code arts. 2983, 2984.
112. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
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language of Articles 2983 and 2984. Articles 2983 and 2984 appear in Title XIV,
"Of Aleatory Contracts," of Book III of the Civil Code. This Title lies between "Of
Deposit and Sequestration" and "Of Mandate and Representation," other nominate
contracts of the Civil Code. Because the Code specifically characterizes aleatory
contracts, courts should consult Title XIV only when they have a valid contract
whose traits are akin to those of aleatory contracts. The lawfulness of the cause and
the validity of the contract are handled in a different part of the Civil Code. Thus,
the placement of Articles 2983 and 2984 within the Civil Code reveals that its
drafters intended for the articles to disallow enforcement of a specific contract that
is otherwise valid under general obligations principles.
Reading Articles 2983 and 2984 a rubrica and giving the caption of Title XIV
its plain meaning also reaches the same conclusion. The wording of Title XIV
clearly states "Of Aleatory Contracts" and indicates that articles contained within
the section apply only to aleatory contracts. By using the word "contract," the
caption also implies that a valid contract has already been formed. Thus, because
Articles 2983 and 2984 are grouped under Title XIV, they apply to contracts that
have been formed with lawful causes.
Reading Articles 2983 and 2984 in pari materia also confirms their purpose to
limit actions for enforcement of certain aleatory contracts. The first article in the
title, Article 2982, defines an aleatory contract as an agreement whose effects
depend on an uncertain event."3 Along with futures and insurance contracts,
gambling contracts are considered aleatory contracts because their results are also
uncertain. When read in pari materia, Articles 2983 and 2984 restrict those
contracts recognized by Article 2982 by disallowing civil actions to enforce those
whose objects pertain to gaming or bets.
Finally, the plain and clear meaning of the articles' wording illustrates that they
should be applied without any restrictions or qualifications."" Articles 2983 and
2984 make no reference to cause or the lawfulness of the event. Article 2983 reads
only that "[t]he law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at
gaming or by bet... ."' Because "gaming" is not qualified, the prohibition should
apply to an action for any game-legal or not. Giving the articles their plain
meaning, the law clearly disallows actions to enforce otherwise legally recognized
gambling debts.
Disallowing actions to enforce gambling debts while at the same time
recognizing their validity under conventional obligations law appears contradictory.
The competing articles have confused courts, including the Major and Gaulon
courts, that have relied on a cause's lawfulness to apply Articles 2983 and 2984
instead of using them as a distinct prohibition to the enforcement of gambling debts.
However, Judge Weimer noted the compatibility. In his concurrence in Major,
Judge Weimer stated that "[I]egislation to prevent an action for gaming debts is not
113. La. Civ. Code art. 2982.
114. La. Civ. Code art. 9 states that when a law is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to
absurd consequences, it should be applied as written.
115. La. Civ. Code art. 2983.
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contradictory to legislation permitting various forms of legalized gaming. It is not
inconsistent to permit gaming, but to prevent the enforcement of gaming debts."
' 16
The policy behind Articles 2983 and 2984 helps explain why courts should apply
them separately and why the law may prefer parties to settle their gambling
contracts outside of the courts.
The policy of Articles 2983 and 2984 can be derived from the policy of one of
its predecessors, the French Code Civil, whose Article 1965 similarly disallows an
action for a debt arising from gaming or bet."7 As explained by Professor Alain
Bnabent of the University of Paris, the purpose of the French code article is to
protect gamblers from the impulses created by gambling, which tend to encourage
gamblers to incur debt."' This policy, if read into the Louisiana Civil Code,
justifies Articles ' 2983 and 2984 independent application instead of requiring a
finding of unlawful cause. Judge Weimer acknowledged this policy in his
concurrence. When discussing the purpose of Article 2983, he noted that, "[ft]he
public policy of protecting those who are problem gamblers could well be
served."".9 Applied separately, the articles would continue the policy established
by the French and deny judicial enforcement of an otherwise valid obligation
because it arose from a gambler's compulsion.
One Louisiana court has analyzed a case using this approach. In Russo v.
Mula, '2 the defendant issued a check to the plaintiff to replace prior checks that
were cashed so the defendant could gamble. The court held that the check was
unenforceable because it had an unlawful cause and because Articles 2983 and
2984 prohibit its enforcement. The critical language of the decision appears after
the court applied Articles 2983 and 2984 to deny enforcement. The court said,
"[t]here is another line of authority to prevent plaintiff s recovery... based on the
ground that courts will not lend aid to enforce contracts.., that are contrary to
good morals or public policy.'' The court then analyzed the lawfulness of the
obligation's cause and found that it too would render the obligation unenforceable.
The Russo court, therefore, recognized that when analyzing a gambling debt,
Articles 2983 and 2984 could be applied independently from, and in addition to, a
finding of an unlawful cause.
Nevada has also used this approach to deny enforcement of gambling debts.
The common law adheres to the Statutes of Anne that expressly prohibit the
enforcement of gambling debts or gambling on credit.' Nevada, which statutorily
allowed casinos to issue markers to gamblers, followed this strict prohibition and
116. Telerecovery of Louisiana Inc. v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947, 952 (La. App. I st Cir. 1999).
117. See supra note 56.
118. See B~nabent, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
119. Major, 734 So. 2d at 952.
120. 49 So. 2d 622 (La. App. I st Cir. 1950).
121. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
122. The adopted English law provides that "all notes... drawn forthe purpose of reimbursing
or repaying any money knowingly lent or advanced for gaming are utterly void, frustrate, and of none
effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." An Act for the Better Preventing Excessive and
Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Anne, c. 14, § 1.
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refused to enforce gambling debts in its courts. The Nevada Supreme Court in Sea
Air Support, Inc. v. Herrmann explained, "despite the fact that gambling, where
licensed, is legal in Nevada, this court has long held that debts incurred, and checks
drawn, for gambling purposes are void and unenforceable."'23 Thus, while Nevada
recognized the legality of gambling debts, it closed its courts to their
enforcement.'24 By examining Nevada's treatment of gambling debts under the
Statutes of Anne, it is not inconsistent to interpret Articles 2983 and 2984 as similar
restrictions on enforcing gambling contracts with an otherwise lawful cause.
Critics of the new approach may try to undermine its second step arguing that
courts should no longer apply Articles 2983 and 2984 because the gaming
legislation has repealed them. A law may be repealed either expressly in new
legislation or implicitly when old law blatantly conflicts or is inconsistent with new
law. Since the Riverboat or the Casino Acts contained no expressed repeal of
Articles 2983 and 2984, only an implicit repeal could render them useless.
However, the legislative intent at the time gaming was legalized and during
subsequent reform efforts negates the proposition of an implicit repeal. As Judge
Weimer correctly stated in his concurrence in Major, "one cannot assume
modification or repeal by implication ... due to the subsequent enactment of
legislation legalizing gaming.""' At the time of enactment of the gaming acts, the
Louisiana Attorney General's office recognized that the Civil Code would have to
be changed because it did not allow for the collection of gambling debts through the
court system.'26 The Casino Board also understood that casinos could lose money
by unwisely granting credit to gamblers.'27 In 1995, the Senate Committee on
Gaming sought the advice of the author of New Jersey's Casino Control Act. He
advised banning credit gambling and suggested that the legislature make gambling
debts illegal and any attempt to collect them a crime. 2 Thus, there seems to have
been legislative knowledge of the problems Articles 2983 and 2984 would present
to the enforcement of gaming debts, but the Legislature took no action to amend or
repeal them.'29 Perhaps this inaction was an advertent attempt to fil any holes in
the express prohibitions in the Riverboat and Casino Acts.
Furthermore, the administrative regulations that permit casino licensees to
extend credit to gamblers cannot by its very nature implicitly repeal Articles 2983
and 2984. Because a regulation is subordinate to legislation, any conflict arising
between the two should be decided in favor of the legislation. If the regulation
123. Sea Air Support, Inc. v. Herrmann, 613 P.2d 413,414 (Nev. 1980).
124. But see infranote 135 and accompanying text that explains how Nevada legislatively reversed
these holdings.
125. Telerecovery of Louisiana, Inc. v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947, 952 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
126. Scott Dyer, Casino Credit Rules Questioned, The Advocate, March 30, 1995, at 4A.
127. Id.
128. He reasoned that while casinos claim they need to attract high rollers, they often use credit
to lure people into playing beyond their means. Scott Dyer, GamblingReform: Could WeStandIt?, The
Advocate, July 14, 1995, at 9B.
129. Representative Charles ("Chuck") McMains was quoted as saying the legislature was ready
to change gambling laws as well as the Civil Code. Ed Anderson,Session's Impact Looms Large, B.R.
Lawmaker Says, Times-Picayune, March 15, 1996, at A3.
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were allowed to supplant the Civil Code, an agency's power would supercede that
of the Legislature, which is inconsistent with the hierarchy of government in
Louisiana.
By looking at the regulations allowing credit extension as a whole, it is
apparent that the Legislature did not have an implicit repeal in mind. The
regulations instruct the casinos to perform a credit check on the gambler before
issuing credit in order to verify the gambler's financial solvency. 3 Thus, the
legislature intended for the casinos to have some assurance of the gambler's
financial situation before they lent money to the gambler.' Conversely, the
legislature also wanted to protect those gamblers most at risk from financial ruin
and prevent those with payment problems from incurring any additional debt.
Given the legislative intent during the passage and reformation of the Casino
and Riverboat Acts, the Legislature neither expressly nor implicitly repealed
Articles 2983 and 2984 in spite of its knowledge of their prohibitory effects.
Therefore, any repeal argument fails because the policies behind the Riverboat and
Casino Acts and the Civil Code are not in conflict but rather quite
complementary.'
B. Some Lessons for the Legislature
1. Other US. Jurisdictions
The common law jurisdictions of the United States adopted the Statutes of
Anne, which prohibits the enforcement of gambling debts or gambling on credit.'33
This rule applied in gambling states like Nevada whose courts continually denied
actions to enforce gambling debts while concurrently recognizing their legality.'34
In 1983, Nevada enacted Revised Statute 463.361 and legislatively allowed for the
enforcement of gambling debts.'" However, only those debts that are evidenced
by a credit instrument can give rise to a civil action.'36 The legislature derogated
from the Statutes of Anne for two reasons: (1) Nevada casinos' traditional high
collection rate on gambling debts was decreasing; and (2) a Federal court removed
130. La. Admin. Code 42:2729(J) (2000).
131. Ironically, a credit check merely shows a potential creditor the applicant's prior payment
history and reveals nothing of the applicant's income or ability to pay.
132. In KentuckyOff-TrackBetting, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1999), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky also addressed the issue of whether the legalization of off-track facilities for horse
racing implicitly repealed a Kentucky statute that voids contracts based on gambling wins and losses.
The court held that there were no legal inconsistencies or ambiguities between the statute and the
contract-prohibiting statute. Id. at 949. Because the statues addressed different legal issues, the court
rejected the argument that the gambling statutes implicitly repealed the prohibition on contracts made
for the consideration of gambling wins or losses. Id.
133. See supra note 122.
134. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
135. Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.361 (2000).
136. Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.361,463:368(2000).
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a tax advantage casinos had by finding that credit instruments are income even
though unenforceable.137 Subsequently, courts were able to hear civil actions for
the enforcement of gambling debts but adhered strictly to the legislative
requirements.'
3
Another gambling state, New Jersey, legislatively modified the Statutes of
Anne when it legalized gambling in order to allow civil actions to enforce gambling
debts under limited circumstances. 39 New Jersey courts have enforced credit
issued by casinos with a strict interpretation of the statutes."a° Thus, even courts in
the most renowned "gambling bastions" refused to enforce gambling debts until the
legislature expressly allowed them to entertain such actions.
Texas, one of many states that have legalized some forms of gambling but
have not legislatively allowed for the enforcement of gambling debts, has also
denied enforcement of gambling debts on public policy grounds. In Carnival
Leisure Industries, Ltd. v. A ubin, the defendant stopped payment on drafts issued
to the plaintiff in exchange for chips used for gambling purposes on plaintiff s
cruise ship.' 4' The U.S. Fifth Circuit recognized that while Texas had legalized
several forms of gambling, the public policy that prevents the enforcement of
gambling debts had not changed.14 2 The court reasoned that even if public policy
towards gambling shifted, "such a shift would not be inconsistent with a
continued public policy disfavoring gambling on credit."'" 3 The court also held
that while the loaned markers could have been used for non-gambling purposes
at the Casino, "it was undisputed they were exclusively used for gambling and
fits squarely within the Texas' prohibition of enforcing gambling debts."'" Thus,
137. Lionel, Sawyer & Collins, Nevada Gaming Law 194-95 (1991).
138. See Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145 n.2 (Nev. 1985) (wamingin dicta that it will continue
to not enforce gaming debts between two playersin the same game or between a casino and a patron
unless they fall within the scope of the recently passed legislation). See also Brett Pulley, Gambler
Learns She Can 't Beat the House in Court, New York Times, March 19, 1998, at Al 2, which gives
examples of situations where courtshave refused to hear cases involving gambling debts unless there
was legislation adopted to allow for recovery.
139. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 5:12-101 (West 2000)which disallows a casino licensee to cash any check,
make any loan or provide any credit to enable any person to take part in a gaming or wagering activity
as a player unless the check is made payable to the casino licensee, the check is dated, the check is
presented to a representative and exchanged for a slip which may be presented for chips, and the
regulations concerning check cashingprocedures are observed. These checks are enforceable at law.
Any check cashed in violation of this law is unenforceable for collection. Under N.J. Admin. Code
19:45, § 1.25(g) (West 2000), the New Jersey Casino Control Commission then adopted regulations
governing check-cashing procedures.
140. See Playboy-Elsinore Assoc. v. Strauss, 459 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983)
(holding that checks issued by defendantwere valid and enforceable because plaintiffcomplied with the
statutory provisions for extending credit).
141. Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafterAubin 11.
142. Id. at 625.
143. Id. at626. See also King InternationalCorp.v.Voloshin,366A.2d 1172,1174(Conn. Super.
Ct. 1976) (stating that "[i]t is notincongruous for a legislature to sanction certain forms of gambling
and still refuse the collection of gambling debts").
144. Aubin 1, 938 F.2d at 626.
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while some states have legalized certain forms of gambling, at the same time they
have refused to enforce obligations arising from gambling on credit.
The U.S. Fifth Circuit has remained firm in its holding that the element of
gambling serves as an absolute bar to recovery in Texas. In Carnival Leisure
Industries, Ltd. v. Aubin, the plaintiff brought charges of fraud against the
defendant after the Fifth Circuit declared the gambling debt was unenforceable. 4 '
The court found that if the consideration of a contract is void as against public
policy, recovery is not available on alternative grounds and stated,
to allow recovery against the defendant on an otherwise unenforceable
gambling debt under a theory of fraud would require us to recognize an
alternative to Texas public policy that does not exist. Moreover, any
alleged wrongdoing or misrepresentation on the part of Aubin is so
inextricably interwoven with the underlying unenforceable gambling
debt that to uphold the finding of fraud would render our opinion utterly
inconsistent with Aubin L '
According to the Fifth Circuit, once a contract is declared void for want of valid
consideration, the court will not allow recovery on other grounds. Whether the
same'theory applies under Louisiana law is undetermined. It is suggested that if
a civil action to recover a gambling debt is disallowed under one theory,
Louisiana courts would also deny such an action on any other grounds so as to
maintain the validity of the purpose and policy behind Articles 2983 and 2984.
2. Civil Jurisdictions
The same confusion has surfaced in jurisdictions whose law is like that of
Louisiana. One example is Puerto Rico, which has legalized gambling 147 and
allows authorized gambling establishments to extend credit to its patrons. 148 The
Puerto Rican Civil Code contains almost identical language to Louisiana's code
and prohibits actions seeking recovery of gaming wins or losses. 49 However, the
145. Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 53 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Aubin II].
146. Aubin 11,53 F.3d at 720.
147. 1948 P.R. Laws 221.
148. 15 R.& R.P.R. § 76a-77(h)issuedbytheSectretariodeHaciendaallows authorized gambling
establishments to extend credit to its patrons. For additional civil jurisdictions that create civil liability
for debts arising from legalized games, see for example Code Civil art. 2629 (1997-1998) (Qutbec)
("Gaming and wagering contracts are valid in the cases expressly authorized by law. They are also valid
where related to lawful activities... "); Cod. Civ. art. 1801 (1991) (Spain) ("The loser of a game or a
bet that is not prohibited remains civilly liable.").
149. P.R. Laws Ann. § 4771 (1990); P.R. Civ. Code art.1698 (1930):
The law does not permit any action to claim what is won in a game of chance, luck, or
hazard; but the person who loses cannot recover what he may have voluntarily paid, unless
there should have been fraud, or should he be a minor or incapacitated to administer his
property.
P.R. Laws Ann. § 4772 (1990); P.R. Civ. Code art. 1699 (1930):
The provisions of section 4771 of this title with regard to gambling are also applicable to
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Puerto Rican Code differs from Louisiana's because it includes an additional
article that expressly creates civil liability for losers in games that are not
prohibited by law.150 In United Hotels of P.R., Inc. v. Willig, the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico resolved that gambling debts were enforceable under Puerto Rican
law."' The court held that because the gambler was participating in an
authorized game, the language ofPuerto Rican Civil Code article 1701 expressly
allowed collection of gaming debts from him.'52
Even though it allows for civil enforcement of certain gambling losses, the
Puerto Rican code does contain a "safety-check" for the continued protection of
gamblers. Puerto Rican courts can refuse to hear a claim or reduce the claim if
it is excessive.'53 Apparently, the Puerto Rican legislature recognized that
gamblers may spend excessive amounts in a casino and fashioned legislation that
would protect them in those instances where their impulses controlled their
wallets. Thus, even though a casino is permitted to bring action to recover on
a marker issued by its patron, Puerto Rican courts are free to deny recovery (or
allow limited recovery) if the amount of the marker is determined to be excessive.
Under both the common law and the civil law, courts have remained
unwilling to enforce gambling debts unless the legislature has expressly
permitted them to do so. Louisiana courts should also interpret Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2983 and 2984 to preclude enforcement of gambling debts despite
the legalization of riverboat and casino gaming and regardless of the grounds on
which a party brings an action. Until the Louisiana legislature amends Articles
2983 and 2984 to permit recovery of gaming debts incurred in legalized gaming
activities, like our common law sister states did with the Statutes of Anne,
Louisiana courts should not follow the decisions of Major and Gaulon.
3. Possible Initiatives for Casinos
While Louisiana courts should not recognize civil liability on instruments
issued to further gaming activities, all is not lost for casinos. There are plausible
alternatives for the casinos that seek relief from their patrons who refuse to pay
their debts: the criminal law and self-help.
betting. Bets analogous to prohibited games are considered as prohibited.
P.R. Laws Ann. § 4773 (1990); P.R. Civ. Code art. 1700 (1930):
Games contributing to the exercise of the body, such as those the object of which is to
acquire skill in the managementofarms, and foot or horse races, byvehicles,ball games, and
others of a similar character are not considered prohibited.
150. P.R. Laws Ann. § 4774 (1990); P.R. Civ. Code art. 1701 (1930):
A person who loses in a game or bet which is not prohibited is civilly liable. Nevertheless,
the judicial authority may either not admit the claim when the sum which was wagered in
the game or bet is excessive, or may reduce the obligation to the amount it may exceed the
customs of a good father of the family.
151. United Hotels of P.R., Inc. v. Willig, 89 P.R. Dec. 188 (1963).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 150.
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a. Criminal Law
The criminal law provides an alternative solution in preventing gamblers from
walking away from their debts. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:71 criminalizes the
issuance of worthless checks."s In State v. Dean, the defendant issued five checks
totaling $21,000 to Players Casino ("Players") in Lake Charles, Louisiana. I The
checks were later dishonored by defendant's bank.' Applying Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:7 1, the court upheld defendant's conviction for writing worthless
checks." 7 Because the statute mandates restitution to the person who initially
honored the check, the defendant was also ordered to pay Player's $9,000 in
restitution. While the criminal law is not used to enforce personal actions between
private parties, casinos may be able to recover gambling debts if the state brings
criminal charges against the defaulting gambler.
b. Self-Help
There are several ways that casinos themselves could take action to enforce
gambling debts and not involve the courts. First, the Louisiana Administrative
Code authorizes the casinos to seek help in collecting on a debt. Casinos may
assign collection to third parties like collection agencies and attorneys in order to
recover on the credit the casinos extended. "' If the debtor refuses to pay after being
warned, the casino could ban the gambler from entering its gambling facilities. I 9
Casinos could also "spread the word" to other casinos and notify them of"problem
gamblers" who do not pay their debts. Effectively banished from most gambling
establishments, the gambler would be encouraged to honor his debts. Finally,
casinos could tighten their procedures in extending credit to their patrons.
Undoubtedly casinos do not favor this option because gamblers' allowances would
be limited and thus wagers kept low."W However, by only extending credit to the
154. La. R.S. 14:71(AXIXa) (1987 and Supp. 2000) states:
Issuing worthless checks is the issuing, in exchange for anything of value...with the intent
to defraud, of any check, draft, or order of payment of money upon any bank ...knowingat
the time of the issuing that the offender has not sufficient credit with the bank...for the
payment of such check, draft or order in full upon its presentation.
155. State v. Dean, 748 So. 2d 57 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999).
156. Id.
157. The defendant attempted to assert Article 2983 in his defense. The court dismissed this
argument by stating it was "an issue that should be regulated by the Legislature and Gaming Control
Board." Since the casino was a business and the check was worthless, the court found the activity
punishable by La. R.S. 14:71. Id. at 59.
158. La. Admin. Code 42:2921,42:2970 (2000).
159. La. Admin. Code 42:3707 (2000).
160. In 1995, the state casino board declined to impose a credit limit for gambling after
encouragement from the New Orleans land casino. The casino operator did not want a limit so "it can
compete with other casinos that are attempting to attract heavy bettors." Scott Dyer, Casino Credit
Rules Questioned, The Advocate, March 30,1995, at 4A. Then vice-president of marketing for Casino
Rouge of Baton Rouge was quoted saying that casinos offer lines of credit to established customers who
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most reliable of patrons, casinos would reduce the risk of default in each
transaction. Until this issue is resolved, casinos in Louisiana would be prudent to
accept only cash from their patrons for participating in its gaming activities.
Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court should address the issues presented
in Major and Gaulon, resolve the apparent contradiction between the gambling
legislation and the Civil Code, and prevent other courts from following the
decisions of Major and Gaulon.6' In doing so, the supreme court should abandon
the-traditional view that Articles 2983 and 2984 are triggered by obligations with
an unlawful cause. Instead, the court should view the articles independently and
use them as intended-to deny civil actions to enforce gambling debts.
The Legislature could more expeditiously eliminate the problem that the courts
have struggled to resolve. It could pass legislation to amend the Civil Code and
provide for judicial enforcement of authorized gambling debts. As seen in the
Quebec, Puerto Rican and Spanish Civil Codes, the Legislature only needs to
qualify "gaming" with "of those not prohibited" in order to relieve courts from the
prohibition. 6 ' Alternatively, the Legislature could pass a statute like that ofNevada
and New Jersey to implicitly repeal the effects of Articles 2983 and 2984.
However, until the Legislature mandates change, courts should continue to apply
Articles 2983 and 2984 as intended-to deny actions to aleatory contracts whose
objects pertain to gaming wins or losses.
With the proliferation of gaming activities in Louisiana, these actions will
continue to arise in courts, and there is presently no clear guidance from either the
Legislature or the decisions of Major and Gaulon. As the written law stands, debts
incurred in gambling activities are unenforceable in Louisiana courts despite any
unfairness to the casinos. The concurring opinion in Aubin I noted that not
enforcing gambling debts sends "a poor message to would be gamblers. Go on
credit and the House takes the risk."63 But, "[a]s occasionally as it occurs, an
outcome which is unjust is not only legally valid but mandated."'" Thus, not
allowing casinos to collect on credit they extended to gamblers may seem to be a
harsh reality. However, casinos are in the business of providing games based on
risk. They, above all others, know that gambling is a double-edged sword because
it works for you as well as against you; for in gambling, loss is imminent.
Lawrence Andrew Melsheimer"
pass an extensive background check and play at a high level. Chris Frink, Casinos Sue Ex-Senate
Hopeful, The Advocate, October 5, 1996, at 3B.
161. See sources cited in supra note 6 and accompanying text.
162. Code Civil art. 2629 (1997-1998)(Qudbec); P.R. Civ. Code art. 1701 (1930); Cod. Civ. art.
1801 (1991) (Spain).
163. Aubin 1, 938 F.2d at 627.
164. Id.
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